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Improperty
In the long-winded and often tiresome discussions devoted to the problem 
of possible meanings of the word “postmodern” the notion of identity is un­
doubtedly one of the key terms around which the vying sides construct their 
basic arguments whether they be “conservative” or “progressive.” The most 
familiar issue is, of course, whether the postulated postmodern identity (if it 
exists) is in fact just a developed form of the modem identity, or whether it 
is a new phenomenon that radically breaks with the modem as an authoritar­
ian paradigm. Such discussions, although they have been pursued for at least 
the last three decades, have not led to any satisfying conclusions. One of the 
points of this essay will be that the reason for this might be at least partially 
due to the overhasty neglect in the analyses of the construction of an identity, 
and especially in its postmodern mutation, of the second term under our sur­
veillance, that is to say, the nature of property and its effects.
It is said that in traditional (“primitive”) societies identity was not prob­
lematic. One grew to become a functional member of one’s tribe or clan and 
his/her identity was a product of a mythical structure which prepared one’s route 
in life in advance and absolutely. Such a structure was free from internal rupture 
because an identity crisis was within its bounds unthinkable. Whether such 
a society was really the case or whether it constitutes just a belated dream of 
the lost immanence of modernity is not the issue here, yet one has to remark 
that what we have just described as the “traditional identity” is not identity in 
the full sense of this word which implies agency that is the outcome of 
a separation: I am the place of my free activity that constitutes me as myself 
for myself as well as within the public sphere. The “invention” of this type 
of identity belongs to the Greeks and is connected to two related developments 
which were not the case in “primitive” societies. The traditional society knows 
only functional property, i.e. the property of the tools necessary to survival in 
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the world and the property which is in its entirety the product of one’s work. 
Such property is not private because it does not serve an individual as differ­
ent and opposed to the member of the tribe. Which brings us to the related 
separation of the public and private spheres that is already in place in the world 
of the Greeks and it is only here that we can speak about property and identity 
in their proper sense.
Yet, the Greek form of property is not property in the modern, abstracted 
sense of this word. First of all, property constitutes one’s place in the world 
and as such it has no exchange value (no value in the modem sense): losing 
property means being excluded from the public sphere of the society of free 
men and entering a lower order of the slave, whether formally enslaved or 
slaving to the necessity of selling one’s talents and abilities in order to sur­
vive. The Greek identity is based on property yet in the mode of negating it: 
I, as a free individual, am everything that in me overreaches the pedestrian 
necessity of the maintenance of my individual physical life. For the Greeks 
property does not mean the riches or it means this only secondarily, since a rich 
slave remains a slave and a poor citizen is still a citizen. The difference between 
them is crucial: a man without his own place is no longer a man, and therefore 
has no identity. This is because man is constituted (e.g. for Aristotle) not by 
work, i.e., his necessary interactive encounter with the materiality of the world, 
but by praxis, i.e. the activity which is the expression of my freedom and, among 
other things, my freedom from necessity. Being rich is important only as far 
as the problem of necessity is concerned: poverty forces a free man to act as 
a slave; a man that is relatively rich is the master of his necessities of life and 
therefore free to overreach his private and particular life and enter the com­
mon, public world where (and this is the only place) he can express himself 
as a free man. The private sphere is always perceived as a bit indecent realm 
of necessity and mysterious (brute?) things that should remain hidden as birth 
and death. In this sense property remains the foundation of identity, yet this 
foundation is perceived as indecent (although necessary). This explains the 
relative lack of development of ancient economies where the wealth is not an 
end in itself, and therefore it is enough for the system to reproduce itself without 
the infinite accumulative necessity. Identity of the Greeks is always the public 
identity that implies the continuity in discontinuity, i.e., on the one hand, dif­
ferent people see a thing from different perspectives, yet there is no question 
of the possibility (a typical modern threat) of each of them seeing something 
else: they know that they see different aspects of the same thing.1
1 The above paragraph is based on: Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition. Ch. II and 
Ch. Ill (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958).
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As far as the question of identity is concerned, the modern paradigm in­
troduces certain new developments of which probably the most important are 
its mutability and enhanced self-reflexivity. First of all, the range of available 
patterns of identity rapidly widens and, apart from that, the available social roles 
become increasingly the subject of one’s conscious choice as one is freer to 
make and remake his identity according to his own will. To summarise very 
briefly, this concept of modern identity has two different incarnations: identity 
as a substantial self and identity as an existential project.2 The first, being to 
a large extent the descendant of the absolutely unique essential and self-iden­
tical substance which was the immortal soul itself,3 was the pervasive motif 
of the western philosophy from Descartes’ res cogitans to Husserl’s transcen­
dental ego and is presented as the already given, innate, unique and stable nature 
of the thinking subject whose task is to shed the illusions of the tradition and 
return to its truthful essence in the process of thinking itself. The second, which 
in different guises one can encounter in the works of Nietzsche, Heidegger or 
Sartre, renounces the pre-given substance of the self in favour of the creation 
of the authentic individual as a task to be accomplished by him/her. Both of 
these attitudes however lead to what by some people is considered to be an 
exclusively modern malady, i.e., the state of anxiety, which is the effect of free­
dom of choice. When the aim is either a return to or an arrival at an authentic 
identity and the accomplishment of this task is left entirely in our hands, the 
possible choice implies that one is always in danger of making a wrong choice 
and therefore wasting one’s life living in the mode of self-delusion. Hence the 
ongoing identity-crisis which is modernity itself. Moreover, the wished-for 
stable and authentic identity (a normative goal), even if it be realised, has to 
be recognised as such also by the others who ultimately constitute it in its 
identity but to whom the being-authentic of somebody else’s identity is not 
available as such.4 This way the process of authentication can never be accom­
plished and the modern subject is constantly in the state of crisis.
The repeatedly employed solutions to such a crisis are two well-known 
projections compensating for a lack one is: either collapsing back into 
a transcendence or leaping forward into an immanence. The first solution is 
to deny entirely the possibilities of modernity and keep presupposing “the 
missing part” outside the world: there is the origin and the principle of the world 
that is other than the world and into which the world will ultimately vanish 
(the God of monotheist religions). Such a principle has been revealed and, in 
order to fill up the lack in oneself, one cannot help but fashion one’s identity 
2 Douglas Kellner, “Popular Culture and the Construction of Postmodern Identities,” 
in Modernity and Identity, eds. S. Lash and J. Friedman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 142.
3 Plato, Phaedrus, 245 C.
4 Kellner, p. 142.
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according to the provided pattern (considering all other patterns as existential­
ly and socially dangerous nonsense because the pattern is the guarantor of both 
a “healthy” identity and a “healthy” community). The second solution is prop­
erly modern: seemingly denying a transcendental prosthesis it finds the “fill­
er” of the lack within the world. Being conscious that the unfulfilled state is 
the identity’s absolute condition it creates a myth of the figure of the absolute 
subjectivity: the Führer. Since, in modernity, the identity anxiety is a mass 
phenomenon, some ideologues worked on the knowledge that “inasmuch as 
the masses have no proper identity, only a myth can provide them with one 
by posing a fiction in which their unity is embodied, depicted - in short: in 
which they auto-envisage or auto-represent themselves as Subject.”5 In the 
figure of the Führer a group (an organisation, a society, a nation, etc.) projects 
its essence as that which is most proper and common to all of them (precisely 
what they actually lack) and what constitutes the (mythical) reality of the organic 
community as the communion between its members, i.e. as “ein totale Staat 
knowing no division, unless it be minimal and intended solely to relate the social 
body to itself between the beloved Chief and his loving subjects.”6 An iden­
tity thus emptied and at the same time fulfilled recognises no exteriority or oth­
erness, no division as such.
The problematics of identity in postmodern theory might be taken as 
a development of the Nietzschean motif but without its “authenticating” co­
ordinates. In the postmodern world identity becomes increasingly fragmented 
and incoherent. It is claimed that since the subject is free to choose his identity 
at will, and since this process is open-ended, in the sense that it has no other 
goal than the immediate satisfaction of certain desires, then there is not such 
thing as authenticity and the identity disintegrates “into a flux of euphoric 
intensities”7 that do not offer any coherence other than accidental. The series 
of fragmentary and short-lived identities refuse to crystallise into anything 
stable.
Such an image of identity that at least allows a certain kind of will or agency 
is sometimes pushed even further. Perhaps the best and most famous example 
of it is a “television identity” as described by Jean Baudrillard. For him tel­
evision is pure noise, a whirlpool of images whose number and speed of cir­
culation reach the verge of perceptual overload. Such a turnover results in the 
implosion of identity where the images no longer have any discernible effects 
and thus they lose their signifying function and turn into pure ecstasy of 
a meaningless spectacle which makes any kind of hermeneutic activity futile. 
5 Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, “The Freudian Subject,” in Who Comes after the Subject?, 
eds. E. Cadava et al. (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 70.
6 Ibid., p. 69.
7 Kellner, p. 144.
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Such spectacle is by its very definition one-dimensional, depthless: whatever 
it presents has to be there on the surface for a very simple reason that an 
imploded identity is the apathy itself, drained of any constitutive energies and 
closed within its own prefabricated house of mirrors.8
Those open-ended or imploded identities are presented as a new phenom­
enon that constitutes postmodemity’s break with the modem paradigm in which 
the surface phenomena had their actual (hidden) meaning, so therefore also with 
the problems of ideology as well as political economy (the new identity is not 
primarily the product of the relations of production and it is not immediately 
connected to the hard facts of economic reality). Leaving alone for now the 
obvious empirical arguments to the contrary (the media propose a very limited 
number of identity patterns for emulation) and remaining on a somewhat more 
abstract level we can ask whether the above are not somewhat premature 
conclusions grounded in a restricted concept of the subject.
The postmodern structure of the (lack of) identity takes the subject to consist 
of no stable features or ground, yet what makes the same subject a stable place 
of the turnover of pleasures or ecstasy is the desire that ultimately constitutes 
the being-identical of the subject: whatever identity the subject momentarily 
takes on goes through the stable point of pleasurable digestion. The effect of 
such a situation is that the turnover of intensities cannot cease because its whole 
identity exists as the point of absorption of pleasure without which this inte­
grative force would stop operating and the identity would disperse into ver­
itable non-existence.
Such a structure, however seems to remind us of another that has been 
analysed over and over again: also the capital is this force whose sole purpose 
is its ever increasing speed of accumulation which is its only way of survival 
because otherwise it would disperse being used up in the process of ever 
increasing consumption.9 Another pertinent feature of the capital here is 
a certain way in which it takes the world away: it transforms the world into 
nothing other than the capital’s reflection. Because human beings become 
themselves only as far as they interact with the world as their place or space, 
everything in the world has a use value and this term designates precisely the 
place of meeting where the object and the subject cease to represent each other, 
where the world defers its separate existence as the object of knowledge and 
where the subjective and the objective lose their meaning becoming alterities 
in communication, i.e. praxis itself. Such place of community is within the logic 
8 See especially: “The Order of Simulacra,” in Symbolic Exchange and Death, trans. I. 
H. Grant (London: Sage, 1993), pp. 50-86; and “The Precession of Simulacra,” in Simulacra 
and Simulation, trans. S. F. Glaser (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994), 
pp. 1-42.
9 Such is the capital’s law: increased production always goes hand in hand with increased 
consumption since the resources of the latter are practically infinite.
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of the capital abstracted into the exchange value, which is nothing other than 
a mirror image of the capital as it takes the world as world away. The exchange 
value is a universal measure with which everything can be measured, yet an 
image-representation which the measuring provides is not the image of the world 
as world (this is given only in praxisluxx. value) but of the capital. In such 
a world also initiative is lost: in spite of the superficial fervour of economic 
activity both the worker and the capitalist are essentially apathetic because they 
are deprived of their own will and are sentenced to reiterate the capital’s logic 
infinitely - in the process of production neither the capitalist nor the worker 
appear as living human beings (alienation).10 11
Such a self-mirroring structure has been many times described as the modem 
self-reflexive constitution of the subject. Within this logic nothing else than the 
subject can appear as the world because every object of consciousness inev­
itable turns into the object of self-consciousness and is therefore an object 
suppressed as object: the world that is given in its use value as a co-ordina­
tion, co-appearance of an object and consciousness, becomes the object of the 
subject - “this other [in our case: the world] is no longer an other but an object 
of a subject’s representation.”11 Such an alterity can only have an instrumental 
(sublatable) and not an ontological role because within this structure all that 
is extraneous turns out to possess a negative but specular identity with the 
representing subject who therefore only mirrors itself in the supposedly extra­
neous other.12 There are, generally speaking, two mutations of such a mirroring 
structure that resist true alterity.
In the first scenario, the subjective situates itself against the world. The 
consciousness is isolated from the objective since both of them, as constituted 
and finished, resist each other. That which enables the presentation of the object 
to consciousness is what we can call, after Kant, the forming force of reason 
or transcendental imagination,13 which are categories empty of any content, 
categories as that which allow us to perceive an entity as a separate entity and 
not as just an aggregate of its sensible qualities (what Heidegger would call 
the “thingness of the thing”). Yet such a presentation called “presence” is al­
ready a figure produced by the subjective because these categories, i.e., what 
allows the subject to perceive something as present, the means by which 
subjectivity installs its object as present to subjectivity, are necessarily the 
10 Leszek Kołakowski, Główne nurty marksizmu (Warszawa: Krąg-Pokolenie, 1989), 
p. 239.
11 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, ed. P. Connor, trans. P. Connor et al. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 24. The remaining part of the essay 
is heavily indebted to this book.
12 Ibid., pp. 23-24.
13 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics, ed. C. Fynsk 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 70.
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product of the subjective. The present object of consciousness is necessarily ideal, 
since, in order to appear in consciousness (in order to present itself), it has to 
be rid of all empirical diversity. In such away, the subjective installs itself and 
becomes its own producer: there is a double mirror within the subject in which 
the subject reflects itself as reflection. Ultimately, and paradoxically, it is the mirror 
that produces everything including the mirror itself and what is presented as the 
world is nothing other than the specular image of the subjective.
For Hegel, subjectivity and objectivity are both moments of the same totality 
that develops itself as the process of its own understanding. Before the sub­
jective and the objective get separated in the movement of dialectics they already 
belong to each other; they are the same “before“ they are different. This in­
tricacy has its source in the nature of the real where what is objective (e.g. being) 
has its subjective moment and what is subjective (e.g. thought) lays claims to 
objectivity.
The existing thing is bound to possess qualities. It has to be determinate 
if it is qualitatively distinct from another being. A quality, as excluding other 
qualities is a limitation and therefore a negation. But since every quality is what 
it is only in relation to other qualities, the thing exists in the wholeness of 
relations with other things. Such an existence, the existence in the sphere of 
“otherness,” is called by Hegel “being-for-other” (Anderssein). But the thing 
is not only formed from the outside, it is not only the aggregation of relations 
and qualities; it also exists as this something that makes it this very thing, 
“being-in-itself” (Ansichseiri). These two moments cannot be separated for the 
obvious reason that one enables another.14
What makes being-in-itself possible is that the thing permanently relates 
to itself.15 Being-in-itself is an intro-fleeted being, a being that has returned to 
itself from being-for-other.16 Intro-flection, however, has always been perceived 
as a subjective quality.17 Yet, the dialectic of the thing has also a third “side.”
Determinate being is more than the flux of changing qualities. Something 
preserves itself throughout this flux, something that passes into other things, 
but also stands against them as a being for itself. This something can exist 
only as the product of a process through which it integrates its otherness with 
its own proper being. Hegel says that its existence comes about through “the 
negation of the negation.” The first negation is the otherness in which it turns, 
and the second is the incorporation of this other into its own self.18
14 Hegel’s Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969), 
p. 120.
15 Ibid., p. 119.
16 Ibid., pp. 119-120.
17 Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 133.
18 Ibid., pp. 132-133.
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Such a process, which Hegel calls “mediation,” creates another subjective 
moment, since it presents things as, to a certain extent, controlling their devel­
opment. But, there is a reason that explains why the objective possesses some 
qualities of the subjective. The reason is simple: in the Hegelian system, re­
ality is the notion.
For Hegel, the opposition of Being and Nothingness is a metaphysical 
fallacy. Since everything in the world is created and then destroyed, the only 
truth that resides in the real is the truth of becoming.19 Because being and 
nothingness are one, everything in the world carries in itself their togetherness. 
That means that every being exists only insofar as it is its own contradiction; 
being contradictory, it is inclusive of its own negation. To maintain its truth, 
the thing has to become what it is not and, in order to do that, it has to leave 
its particularity behind. Thus the truth of something particular exceeds its 
particularity and, by relation with other things, becomes “a totality of conflict­
ing relations.”20 Therefore the truth of the real can only be universal. This truth 
is expressed in the notion (Begriff).
To common sense, what exists is particular (this was the earliest pre-So- 
cratic intuition) and what is universal is “just” thought. As such it has the status 
of only the “second-rate” existence or the semblance of existence proper. This 
way thought becomes only an indifferent form that lacks substantial links with 
its particular content. Hegel opposes this view,21 for him, the universal - and 
the universal can only be present to thought - not only exists but is also more 
real than the particular:
The indispensable foundation, the notion, the universal which is the thought 
itself [...] cannot be regarded as only an independent form attached to 
a content. But these thoughts of everything natural and spiritual, even the sub­
stantial content, still contain a variety of determinatenesses and are still 
charged with the difference of a soul and a body, of the notion and a relative 
reality; the profounder basis is the soul itself, the pure Notion which is the 
very heart of things, their simple life-pulse, even of the subjective thinking 
of them.22
Since the notion exists only for thought23 and, at the same time, is also the 
“pulse” of reality, the objective world is the “result” of some absolute thought 
that thinks itself. (Hegel calls this thought the Absolute Idea.) This way sub­
jectivity finds itself as being realised in objectivity. It also means that the object 
19 Hegel's Science of Logic, pp. 82-83.
20 Marcuse, p. 124.
21 Hegel’s Science of Logic, pp. 35-36.
22 Ibid., p. 37.
23 Ibid., p. 35.
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is never exterior to thought; they are always already in some kind of concord 
because the dialectics is not only a method in the sense of an instrument that 
is applied from the outside, “a means standing on the subjective side by which 
this side relates itself to the object,”24 25but is also, and at the same time the 
“substantiality of things,"75 i.e. the very way the thing exists, develops itself, 
and is its aforementioned truth.
But in such a system the other gets lost again. Hegelian reality is a totality 
which is a system of relations in which the interval between the same and the 
other has only a temporary (although necessary) existence before the two terms 
get adequated within a larger totalisation. Because the same depends on the other 
to seize itself, such an other becomes only a moment of the same. This pro­
cess poses the other as the guarantee of the totality: negation is always pure, 
which means that there is no absolute Other within the system, there is only 
nothing which is a pure abstraction and this purity is precisely what enables 
it to disappear only to come back on a higher level of totality. Negativity is 
only “that same” whose sole purpose is the return to “this same” vanishing 
completely on the way.26
Both of the above ways in which subjectivity relates to the objective end 
in the final analysis with the subject that projects its own image on the world 
and taking its projection as the world itself. As we have already noticed, in 
similar ways the capital turns everything (including identity/subjects) into its 
exchange value which in fact is no feature of the object but the capital’s specular 
reflection in everything it encounters and the reason it cannot encounter any­
thing else than itself. What is more, within such an understanding, both the 
subject and the capital are infinite. This does not mean that the subject or the 
capital are immortal but that they cannot be outside themselves: their limit does 
not concern them, it simply surrounds them.27
In all the above senses the capital and the (post?)modem identity constitute 
parallel if not identical structures as it had been the case throughout the modern 
era, and so it is quite difficult to understand the repeatedly proclaimed diag­
noses of the death of ideology. When it is claimed that the postmodern subject 
is a radically desubstantialised formation, a purely functional space of the 
turnover of intensities which displays no stability, no substance, and which is 
pure jouissance (that such a structure is neither a substantial phenomenon nor 
a project in which the identity is understood as a task in the process of being 
accomplished), such jouissance is in no position to escape the logic we have 
24 Ibid., p. 827.
25 Ibid., p. 826.
26 Joseph Libertson, Proximity: Levinas, Blanchot, Bataille and Communication (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), p. 30.
27 Nancy, The Inoperative Community, p. 27.
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pursued so far, since that instantaneous jouissance or a series of unrelated 
intensities is precisely the place/moment where the subject’s self-presence of 
itself is constituted.28 The subject of jouissance, although it is neither a Cartesian 
substantial subject nor an existential project in accomplishment, is neverthe­
less the subject of desire which, although it will never fill up the lack it is (it 
is “sentenced” to desire), represents itself as essentially consisting of such a lack. 
(This is the postmodern theory itself: the new identity is essentially the lack 
of identity.) Such a subject has to be understood as a work. Although this work 
is not worked up along a pre-established teleological trajectory (substance), 
although it is not even the work in the process of working up its trajectory and 
goal (project), it is nevertheless a work whose essence is the very working up 
of itself and which identifies/represents itself as such. This returns us to the 
logic of the capital again: it has no other aim than working up of itself (ac­
cumulation); the riches are, in a sense, only a by-product of capital’s work; the 
capital goes nowhere and when its work ceases it wastes away immediately. 
And it is not true that jouissance is modelled on the notion of abandon and 
expenditure while the capital is a product of the sparing economy - as we have 
already noticed, the quicker and bigger accumulation, the quicker and bigger 
spending (hence the infinite necessity of ever increasing accumulation).
From the above one thing is clear: identity is inextricably connected with 
the classical notion of the subject in all its incarnations because what is called 
identity is, as its very name says, the way the subject identifies itself, i.e. 
represents itself for itself. Such a representation cannot avoid a very simple 
logic: because the subject as subject is the master of its projections, the iden­
tity will always be something over which a subject exercises complete control 
but which is at the same time in complete control of the subject since it is its 
own mirror image. In this sense identity always is property (something that the 
subject has) but at the same time the subject itself is the property, its own 
property, since it can only be itself by possessing itself in its self-representa­
tion. Therefore, in the final analysis, the subject/identity is always a thing: 
something that is possessed and possessable. Identity equals property.
Is there then any escape from that logic which always turns out to be 
representing the being that is dead and by that means an immortal monad? 
Maybe the first move should be the clearing of the field and getting rid of the 
dead matter that has been persistently superimposed on the singular being as 
its very ownmost advantage, what is added to this being as a certain quality 
or the surplus which is produced by self-representation, i.e., the identity itself. 
What will be able to take the place of identity, what will not be the identity 
of a thing, and therefore a non-identity, cannot start with the individual as 
defined by its self-knowledge, and therefore property. The non-identity, or what 
28 Ibid., p. 23.
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one would rather call improperty (not proprius, not one’s own, but also not 
suitable because not following suit, and therefore unbecoming, even indecent) 
can only begin with relation, which is prior to knowledge, also self-knowledge, 
since no knowledge exists in a pure state, but it is always articulated in a certain 
language and is therefore a communicative or communal phenomenon.29 Thus, 
otherwise than identity-property which starts with a certain addition, improp­
erty starts with a subtraction: the subtraction of identity-property. But what is 
such a subtracted being if it is anything? Yes, properly speaking it is nothing 
(it is not something) but it is a nothing that is shared, by which the singular 
beings are related: it is the sharing of the lack of identity.30 Yet this lack of 
identity is not a higher form of “substance” in which the beings can recognise 
themselves and with this their essence (something we have already encoun­
tered in the notion of jouissance). Although lack of identity is not necessarily 
something that implies relation, rather the opposite as it is clear from the 
examples of mental disturbances (a person whose identity collapsed tends to 
become a monad), there is a lack of identity that we can recognise as being 
shared by all of us: this is our condition of being mortal beings. Our finitude 
is something that we share, death is common to us all. But what brings us 
together also keeps us aparf. I cannot recognise my death in the death of the 
other, since my death is my “ownmost possibility” that cannot be reappropri­
ated through the other.
No one can take the Other’s dying away from him. Of course someone can 
“go to his death for another.” But that always means to sacrifice oneself for 
the Other “in some definite affair.” Such “dying for” can never signify that 
the Other has thus had his death taken away in even the slightest degree. Dy­
ing is something that every Dasein itself must take upon itself at the time. 
By its very essence, death is in every case mine, insofar as it “is” at all. And 
indeed death signifies a peculiar possibility-of-Being in which the very Be­
ing of one’s own Dasein is at issue. In dying, it is shown that mineness and 
existence are ontologically constitutive for death.31
According to Heidegger, the only utterance in which Dasein finds authentic 
expression is: I am bound to die. Yet in this way my death becomes a work 
(in the sense of jouissance): although it is properly speaking nothing (it has 
no substantial identity), it semi-represents itself in the way I work myself 
towards my authentic existence. But death is precisely that which cannot be 
turned into a work as the identity to come - the work of death is what destroys 
29 Kołakowski, p. 132.
30 Nancy, The Inoperative Community, p. xxxvii.
31 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. MacQuairre and E. Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1962), p. 284.
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all identity.32 Moreover, for Heidegger, the consciousness of my finitude tears 
me away from being with others and throws me back at my selfhood: face to 
face with its own death Dasein’s, being-with (Mitseiri) - supposedly constitu­
tive of its mineness - becomes irrelevant.
Death is a possibility-of-Being which Dasein itself has to take over in every 
case. With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for- 
Being. [...] If Dasein stands before itself as this possibility, it has been fully 
assigned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. When it stands before itself 
in this way, all its relations to any other Dasein have been undone. This 
ownmost non-relational possibility is at the same time the uttermost one.33
Such an existential solipsism34 misses one important point however. Although 
it is true that I cannot recognise myself in the death of others and that their 
deaths do not create a homogenous we as: “we the mortal beings,” because death 
is not common to us all (your death is not mine, I can’t even imagine it along 
the same lines), and although my finitude is nothing (I cannot make 
a representation of it), yet it appears, but its appearance (which is not 
a representation) demands relation as its possibility: I experience my finitude 
in the finitude of the other which is not my finitude (I can represent the death 
of the other). So, to be more precise, one should say that finitude co-appears, 
since the appearance of death is impossible without the other.35
In the light of the above we can return to some terms that are deemed to 
be new in the constitution of the postmodern identity. We have seen that 
understanding a new subjectivity as consisting of a series of temporary inten­
sities which leads to the collapse of the hermeneutic depth, which in turn results 
in the superficiality and exhaustion of the postmodern culture, brings us back 
to the same problems we had encountered in the modern identity, so, in fact, 
there in no radical difference here. But maybe the terms that are used while 
describing a postmodern identity, can have a different meaning that would fit 
our improper terms?
Improperly is definitely not static: what we encounter here is not a question 
of a link or bond between the formerly constituted identities - communication 
or relation does not mean intersubjectivity.36 37Since relation is always anterior, 
the relationship between “you” and “I” is not a juxtaposition but exposition or, 
in other words, ecstasy31 where ecstasy does not mean the idiotic fascination 
32 Nancy, The Inoperative Community, p. 15.
33 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 294.
34 Jean-François Courtine, “Voice of Conscience and Call of Being,” in Who Comes 
after the Subject?, p. 86.
35 Nancy, The Inoperative Community, p. 28.
36 Ibid., p. 29.
37 Ibid.
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of a monad with itself as spread out in an excessive number of images that 
approach the point of perceptive overload. Such a “postmodern” understand­
ing of ecstasy always has to lead to the identity of the opposites that sooner 
or later will become one through sublation, and it does not really matter whether 
it is the consciousness that absorbs the outside images (the classical concept 
of the subject) or the outside images that absorb the consciousness (the post­
modern concept of the subject). We have seen that in the final analysis, the 
difference is only superficial.
There is also another term, apart from ecstasy, that we can utilise as far as 
the discourse of improperty is concerned. The postmodern subject is said to 
be depthless which, ultimately, is to lead to the abandonment of thinking, 
philosophy, etc. since if everything that there is to it is displayed on the sur­
face of what is seen, the uncovering process, that is usually conceived as being 
identical to philosophy-hermeneutics, is spurious, because there is no hidden 
meaning beyond the surface nature of the image. Here again we are led into 
a kind of idiotic narcissism, which a postmodern identity is said to constitute. 
But, again, the idiocy is there only as long as we stick to a monadic notion 
of the subject. In that case, as we have seen, since all the objects are always 
the objects of the subject, the object is ultimately only an image in which 
a subject represents itself to itself. Such an image has no depth because in it 
the reason can see only what it has already invested there - this is the ultimate 
case of narcissism. Yet in the discourse of improperty what is there in the first 
place is not an object, not a representation: first comes the sharing38 (both 
dividing and having in common) of our finitude, our mortal bodies. As we have 
seen, the finitude is not an object (not an object of knowledge) because it cannot 
be reappropriated as a representation or a work. Where there is no object, also 
the subject is impossible (as a transcendental ground) and what is left is the 
imageless body, the body - my body - but, as in the case of my death, the body 
as given to me without becoming a thing I own, without being reaproppriated 
through the representation that other bodies are for me.39 Improperty is also 
(if not first of all) my body but my body as a undifferianted weight, mass; the 
body with no representation superimposed on it, the body without organs, if 
organs are functional parts of the whole.40 One does not have a body, one is 
a body in the fullest possible sense of this word. Obviously such a body has 
no depth, because it does not provide any representation below which one can 
dive. What happens is actually the opposite: a naked body is precisely what 
38 Nancy’s term: partage.
39 Jean-Luc Nancy, “Corpus,” in The Birth to Presence, trans. B. Holmes et al. (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 199.
40 Ibid., 203. “Body without organs” is of course Antonin Artaud’s image (cf. 84, No­
vember 1947, p. 102).
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appears (co-appears: without other bodies, which I can turn into representa­
tions, I would not be conscious of my own body) to reveal that “there is nothing 
to reveal, everything is there exposed.”41 The body does not hide anything; here 
“endlessly, the mass rises to the surface and peels off as surface”42 Improperly 
is precisely the place-moment where this peeling off, this exposure takes place. 
Therefore improperly is depthless, it is all surface, yet it does not mean that 
it is superficial. Moreover, improperly does not think, if thinking is conceived 
as the representing activity of reason. But doesn’t the improper way in which 
the body shares itself without becoming itself in representation (then there would 
be nothing to share) deserve to be called thought - not philosophy but fecund 
thought of the world in praxis! One may wonder if there is anything postmod­
ern about it.
41 Ibid., p. 205.
42 Ibid., p. 199.
